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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE SECTION 6-201: A
PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE STOCKS
AND MUTUAL FUNDS
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) section 6-201, entitled "Provi-
sions for Payment or Transfer at Death,"' authorizes the use of will
substitutes2 as alternatives to testamentary disposition.3 Will substi-
tutes are the functional equivalents of wills; they are used by prop-
erty owners to transfer property at death, yet they need not satisfy
the legal formalities which attend testamentary disposition. Will
substitutes attract property owners because they enable them to
transfer property at their death outside the probate system, thus
avoiding the system's costs and delays. 4
Since will substitutes became popular in the 1960s, courts have
treated them erratically, sometimes characterizing them as valid
nontestamentary transfers, other times as invalid testamentary
transfers.5 In enacting section 6-201, the drafters endeavored to
eliminate the confusion surrounding will substitutes by deeming
nontestamentary a variety of arrangements made in "payable on
death" (POD) or "transfer on death" (TOD) form.6 The statute's
1 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201 (1983). See infra text accompanying note 85 for
statutory language.
2 See Browder, Giving or Leaving-What is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 845 (1977) (de-
fining "will substitute" as inter vivos transaction which seems to serve purposes of will).
3 T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 1 (2d ed. 1953) ("testamentary
disposition" is transfer of property made through will).
4 Professors Dukeminier and Johanson summarize the expense of probate as
follows:
The administrative costs of probate are mainly probate court fees, the
commission of the personal representative, the attorney's fee, and some-
times appraisers' and guardians ad litem's fees. In most states the per-
sonal representative's commission is set by statute at a fixed percentage
of the probate estate. The fee of the attorney for the personal represen-
tative is sometimes set by statute, but more often is determined by the
court by reference to a number of factors (including customary charges
for probate work, complexity of the estate, time and labor required, and
whether the attorney prepares the tax returns).
J. DUREMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 39 (3d ed. 1985) (citations
omitted).
Will substitutes and alternative forms of dual ownership have limits; in certain situa-
tions a will is still the most effective means of property transfer. See Wellman, The Uni-
form Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191, 194 (1968) (wills
and probate are still best options for large estates that require extensive planning and
estates which are expected to invite bitter contests).
5 See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
6 For convenience, this Note uses the term "POD" to denote both the POD and
TOD forms.
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vague provisions, however, have left open to question 7 whether the
statute encompasses two extremely important forms of wealth-
stocks and mutual funds. 8
This Note explores the inadequacy of the present form of UPC
section 6-201. It discusses the statute's purpose and structure, its
relation to the rest of the UPC, and its potential application to
stocks and mutual funds. Part I briefly addresses the law of wills,
including the role will substitutes play in property transfer.9 Part II
examines the general theory of the UPC and its attempt to respond
to heightened dissatisfaction with probate systems.10 Part III ana-
lyzes UPC section 6-201. t t It addresses the limited scope of the
statute and recommends that the present form be amended to in-
clude PODs on stocks and mutual funds. Part IV proposes a more
comprehensive nonprobate transfer statute: it recommends that sec-
tion 6-201 transfers be deemed valid testamentary transfers in order
to allow established doctrines of the law of wills to govern situations
requiring legal interpretation. 12
I
BACKGROUND TO THE LAW OF WILLS
A. Wills: The Traditional Tools of Property Transfer
Since at least sixteenth-century England, 13 the classic form of
property transfer has been testamentary disposition-disposition
through a will.1 4 Many traditional English concepts inhere in con-
7 TheJoint Editorial Board of the UPC is currently considering revisions to article
6 of the UPC, including section 6-20 1. Telephone interview with Richard Wellman, Ed-
ucational Director of the Joint Editorial Board of the UPC (Nov. 1985).
Professors Dukeminier and Johanson pose the following hypothetical to their read-
ers: "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, a brokerage house, holds stocks as custo-
dian for many of its customers. Can a customer of Merrill Lynch put on her custodial
account a legally effective payable-on-death designation, thus passing the stocks upon
her death directly to the designee, bypassing probate?" J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
supra note 4, at 315.
8 Wiesenberger Investment Companies Service, Investment Companies 10 (45th
ed. 1985) [hereinafter Wiesenberger]. A "mutual fund" is an open-ended investment
company whose total number of shares outstanding fluctuates on a day-to-day basis.
Investment companies pool many investors' funds and invest that pool in a variety of
securities. Thus, mutual funds give their shareholders the benefits of continual profes-
sional management and a diversified portfolio.
9 See infra notes 13-73 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text. The language of this Note's pro-
posed amendments to § 6-201 is presented at infra note 119.
13 Although the first statute of wills was passed in England in 1540, rudimentary
forms of testamentary disposition were used throughout the Anglo-Saxon era. T. AT-
KINSON, supra note 3, § 3.
14 Id.§ 1.
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temporary succession law; 15 in particular, modem will law observes
certain formalities of execution which evolved as the requirements
for valid testamentary transfer. The formalities required by the
Statute of Wills of 1540,16 the Statute of Frauds of 1677,17 and the
Wills Act of 183718 find modem expression in statutes which pro-
vide that a will must be in writing, 19 signed by the testator,20 and
attested by two disinterested witnesses.2 1 In the aggregate, the for-
malities serve cautionary, evidentiary, protective, and channeling
functions that ensure that a will clearly reflects the testator's
intent. 2
2
The legal formalities of wills serve a cautionary or ritual func-
tion by attempting to force the testator to analyze seriously the con-
tents and consequences of his final testament.23 The ritual of
execution helps ensure that a testator does not act haphazardly.
24
The legal formalities of wills serve an evidentiary function by
ensuring that evidence of testamentary intent is cast in the most "re-
liable and permanent" form possible. 25 The writing requirement
controls the interpretation of any ambiguities in the testament, the
signature positively identifies the testator as the maker of the docu-
ment, and attestation provides proof of the circumstances of due
execution. 26 The evidentiary function is important because when
the testator dies, the best evidence for proving the validity of his will
15 Id. §3.
16 Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1. This statute permitted a devise of land
by written instrument but did not require either signature by the testator or attestation.
The instrument was revocable and inoperative until death, but did not pass property
obtained after the will's execution. T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 83.
17 Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3. This statute specified that testaments
for both land and personalty (subject to certain exceptions) be in written form, but it did
not require signature or attestation. However, a testator in his final sickness could, in
the presence of witnesses, make an oral will for the passage of chattels. Id.
18 Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 and I Vict., ch. 26. This Act prescribed uniform rules
for execution, revival, and construction of wills for realty and personalty. It required
that a will be signed by the testator (or by someone in his presence and by his direction)
and by two or more witnesses in his presence. Id.
19 T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 63.
20 Id. § 64. Signing a will by a proxy in the testator's presence is also acceptable.
Id.
21 Id. § 65.
22 Gulliver & Tillson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE LJ. 1, 5-13 (1941)
(outlining functions served by statutes of wills); see also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
CoLuM. L. REv. 799, 800-01 (1941) (disentangling formal and substantive elements in
context of consideration).
23 Gulliver & Tillson, supra note 22, at 5.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 6.
26 Id. at 6-8.
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dies, also.27
Testamentary formalities serve a channeling 28 function by ex-
pediting wills through the legal system. If a will has certain standard
characteristics, the legal system processes it with greater speed and
confidence than if the will requires prolonged scrutiny for evidence
of testamentary intent.
2 9
Finally, Wills Act3 0 formalities serve a protective function:31
they guard against fraud or coercion by interested beneficiaries. For
example, some statutes require that witnesses to the execution of a
will be "competent," that is, that they have no financial interest in
the testamentary provisions 32 and are therefore not motivated to
undernine the testator's chosen plan.33 Some commentators sug-
gest that the protective function afforded by Wills Act formalities,
although still important, has shifted from its original emphasis.3 4 In
the past, testators often executed wills on their death beds, provid-
ing an ideal setting for fraud and undue influence.35 Today, how-
ever, most people execute their wills in the presence of an attorney
and at a relatively young age, reducing significantly the potential for
that type of abuse. 36
Perhaps a will's most attractive feature is that it is ambulatory: it
is both revocable and ineffective to pass title until death.
37
27 Id. at 6. In addition, the time lapse between execution and probate may dull the
attesting witnesses' memories. Id.
28 Fuller, supra note 22, at 801. The channeling function was not among the origi-
nal aims of the law of wills, but rather derives from Professor Lon Fuller's article on the
functions of legal formalities in contracts. Professor Fuller specifically addressed the
role of seals as a means of channeling contracts through the legal system. Id.
29 Id. (discussing how form offers channels for "legally effective expression of in-
tention"). The estate and its beneficiaries benefit from formalities because routine judi-
cial administration lowers costs.
30 This Note uses the term "Wills Act" to refer generally to any state statute (or
statutes) which sets forth the requirements for validly attested wills.
31 Gulliver & Tillson, supra note 22, at 9.
32 For example, under the Statute of Frauds, a devisee-witness was not a valid at-
testing witness to a will. T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 65. Very few states today have
such a requirement. But see IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-2 (Bums 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-604 (1986).
33 Gulliver & Tillson, supra note 22, at 11. The Uniform Probate Code has elimi-
nated the requirement of disinterested witnesses. Unif. Probate Code § 2-505 (1983).
The official comment to § 2-505 notes that the requirement that witnesses be disinter-
ested to qualify as competent failed to prevent fraud and undue influence-apparently, a
disinterested witness may undermine a testator as well as an interested witness. Id.
comment.
34 See, e.g., Gulliver & Tillson, supra note 22, at 9-10.
35 Id. at 10.
36 Id.
37 Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 Ky. LJ. 283, 285 (1931) ("The non-obliga-
tory character of a will until the testator's death, its inoperativeness on the property until
that time, its revocability by the testator, the fact that it leaves the testator unhampered
400 [Vol. 72:397
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Although perhaps mutually inconsistent, 38 these characteristics of
testamentary disposition are attractive to estate planners3 9 because
they enable property owners to maintain control over the bulk of
their wealth until they die.40 To complicate matters, many property
owners also wish to avoid the costs, delays, and inefficiency of pro-
bate by giving away some property interests as inter vivos trans-
fers.4 ' As a result, they manipulate inter vivos transfers to
approximate the favorable ambulatory characteristics of testamen-
tary disposition. 42 The incompatibility of these goals creates ten-
sion and confusion regarding nonprobate transfers made in will
substitute form.
B. Will Substitutes: Modem Innovations in Property Transfer
The level of public dissatisfaction with contemporary probate
systems peaked in the mid-1960s.43 Numerous critical books44 and
articles45 appeared. Typical complaints were that courts had unnec-
essary and lengthy control over fiduciary estate administration and
in the control of the property are summed up ... in the technical phrase that a will is
ambulatory until the testator's death.").
38 See id. at 283-85. In 1931, Professor Bordwell recognized that in certain respects
ineffectiveness until death and revocability are parts of the same testamentary require-
ment that the testator not be bound until his death. Id. Nonetheless, he saw a distinc-
tion between the two characteristics: ineffectiveness until death relates to property and
revocability relates to a person. Id. Forty-six years later, Professor Browder stated that
the two elements are either two ways of saying the same thing or inconsistent-he found
the notion of revoking a property transfer which has not yet taken effect inherently illog-
ical. Browder, supra note 2, at 850.
39 T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 38 (defining advantages of a will as providing se-
crecy over plan of disposition, total enjoyment of property for testator during life, and
revocation privileges).
40 Id. § 31.
41 See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
42 Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 489, 504
(1975).
43 Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1108, 1116 (1984) (discussing poor reputation of probate system with general
public); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND.
LJ. 191, 192-94 (1968) (discussing public perceptions of probate system).
44 See, e.g., N. DAcEY, How To AVOID PROBATE (1966). Dacey's chief criticisms are
that probate law and procedure are archaic, needlessly complex, and function for the
benefit of the probate bench and bar. Furthermore, Dacey asserts that property succes-
sion through probate is expensive and time-consuming and that lawyers' interests in
probate fees conflict with their clients' best interests. In essence, Dacey recommends
that property owners avoid probate by placing their property in trusts and joint tenan-
cies. Wellman, supra note 43, at 193; see National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole Uniform Probate Code 1
(Aug. 4, 1966, available on microfiche) (hereinafter Proceedings] (statement of Richard
Wellman) (describing Dacey's book as "non-fiction bestseller").
45 E.g., Wellman, Introduction to the Uniform Probate Code, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 446,
448 (1976). For a discussion of the evolution of the UPC, see infra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
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that estate distribution was too complicated, taking up to four years
and creating burdensome expenses exacerbated by unnecessary
court procedures. 46 In addition, steadily rising levels of affluence
and complex tax laws led to increased public awareness of estate
planning techniques.47
In response, property owners turned from testamentary dispo-
sition to prepackaged probate avoidance mechanisms known as will
substitutes. Will substitutes are financial instruments or arrange-
ments which, like wills, provide for property transfer at the owner's
death. Unlike wills, however, they take effect without conforming to
Wills Act formalities or clearing probate. Courts have validated
most will substitutes under two theories: the present interest theory
and the alternative formality theory. Under the present interest the-
ory the transferee is said to acquire an interest during the trans-
feror's lifetime. Because the transfer is not made at the testator's
death, it is deemed nontestamentary; hence, the transfer need not
satisfy Wills Act requirements in order to be effective.
48
The other popular basis for validating will substitutes is the al-
ternative formality theory. 49 This theory holds that will substitutes
exhibit formalities (such as written terms and signatures) that ade-
quately parallel Wills Act requirements. 50 If there is evidence that
the alternative formalities discourage testators' impulsive actions
and reduce the threat of forgery, fraud, or coercion, courts adhering
to this theory accept the alternative formalities as substitutes for
Wills Act requirements. 5 1 As one commentator explains, "Alterna-
46 Administrative Portions of Draft Uniform Probate Code-An Appraisal, 2 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR.J. 273, 274 (1967) [hereinafter Draft); see also J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
supra note 4.
47 See Wellman, supra note 43, at 194.
Most individuals want property to pass quickly at their death, with little interference
from courts and third parties.
Frequently, clients believe that the making of a will renders court pro-
ceedings unnecessary at death. After the client is informed that this is a
false assumption, his next inquiry is what can be done now to avoid a
court proceeding at death? Thus, there is a public misunderstanding of
the function of our system of passing property at death and a general
distrust of the probate court as such.
Draft, supra note 46, at 274.
48 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1108; see Hart v. Savings & Profit Sharing Pension
Fund of Sears, Roebuck & Co., 291 F. Supp. 95, 97 (E.D. Va. 1968) (pension fund valid
as either inter vivos trust or third party beneficiary contract because settlor passed an
interest "in praesenti" and beneficiary received vested, albeit defeasible, interest); Far-
kas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 421-22, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (1955) (stock issued in inter
vivos trust form valid in part because settlor intended to create present interest in
property).
49 See Langbein, supra note 43, at 1130-34.
50 For a discussion of Wills Act formalities and their functions, see supra notes 15-
27 and accompanying text.
51 Langbein, supra note 43, at 113 1; see, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5 Il. 2d 417, 433,
402 [Vol. 72:397
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tive formality is not a test for compliance with the Wills Act; it is a test
for not having to comply with the Wills Act."
52
One commentator divides will substitutes into two types: imper-
fect and pure. 53 Imperfect will substitutes are used to effect com-
pleted lifetime transfers, the most popular of which is the common
law joint tenancy. 54 Althoughjoint tenancies may achieve the same
results as wills, their clear disadvantage is that they are not ambula-
tory: one party can never revoke or modify a joint tenancy because
both parties have undivided ownership interests. 5
5
Pure will substitutes such as life insurance, pension accounts,
joint accounts, and revocable trusts more closely achieve the func-
tions of a will. Unlike imperfect will substitutes, pure will substi-
tutes afford the owner complete lifetime dominion over his
property, including the power to name and change beneficiaries un-
til he dies. For instance, if the holder of a life insurance policy
designates a beneficiary, he is not bound to that choice; like a testa-
tor, he can freely change beneficiaries until he dies. Nevertheless,
because the policy is a will substitute it need not be probated.
56
Property owners may purchase pure will substitutes from a variety
of institutional sources: life insurance companies, pension plan op-
erators, commercial banks, savings banks, investment companies,
and brokerage houses. 57 Because financial intermediaries market
such will substitutes by using standard form instruments with fill-in-
125 N.E.2d 600, 608 (1955) (revocable inter vivos trust valid in part because intent man-
ifested in solemn and formal manner).
52 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1132 (distinguishing alternative formality and sub-
stantial compliance).
53 Id. at 1109 (separating will substitutes according to whether owner maintains
complete control over property during his life (pure) or relinquishes all control
(imperfect)).
54 Id. at 1114. "[E]ach joint tenant] owns the undivided whole of the property; this
being so, when one joint tenant dies nothingpasses to the surviving joint tenant or ten-
ants. Rather, the estate simply continues in survivors freed from the participation of the
decedent, whose interest is extinguished." J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 486
(1981) (citations omitted).
55 See Langbein, supra note 43, at 1114. In a joint tenancy arrangement involving
stocks, registered bonds, or promissory notes, both parties must endorse the instrument
in order to transact any business while both parties are alive. Sheard, Avoiding Probate of
Decedents' Estates, 36 U. CINN. L. REv. 70, 78 (1967). For an in-depth discussion of the
limitations of the joint tenancy, see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
56 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1109.
57 Id. at 1108. Scholars and estate planners alike recognize the general utility of
will substitutes. See, e.g., UNIP. PROBATE CODE, introductory remarks 4-6 (National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Working Draft No. 3, 1967) [hereinaf-
ter DRAr CODE] (statement of Richard Wellman, Project Director). In his opening
address at the 1966 annual meeting of the commissioners, UPC Chief Reporter Richard
Wellman stated, "Lawyers, whose stock in trade has been the will, cannot, in good con-
science, describe the will as competitive from the standpoint of post-death expense and
delay, with the host of will substitutes that are available." Id. at 5.
1987]
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the-blank beneficiary designations, they have been described as
"mass will substitutes. ' 5 8
The advent of will substitutes has led to a significant decline in
the need for formal testamentary disposition. However, this decline
does not derive from a diminished need for the safeguards estab-
lished by Wills Act formalities-generally, such protections are as
needed as ever.59 As property transfer mechanisms shift from pro-
bate to nonprobate, we must find ways to approximate the old forms
without compromising these protections.
C. Stocks and Mutual Funds: Their Limited Use
as Will Substitutes
Increased affluence since World War II is largely responsible
for the current deluge of will substitutes. 60 This wealth has spurred
the rise in two forms of investment: stocks and mutual funds6' of-
fered through investment companies. As of mid-1983, 42,360,000
individuals had holdings in stocks and mutual funds, in addition to
the holdings of institutional investors such as colleges and pension
funds.62 At year-end 1984, there was a total of $363 billion placed
with investment companies by individuals and institutional inves-
tors,63 matched by a total of $775 billion invested in stock ex-
changes at year-end 1983.64
At present, stocks and mutual fund shares may be held only in
imperfect will-substitute arrangements. No form of registration en-
ables shareholders to name a share certificate beneficiary; a property
owner who wishes to transfer share certificates outside of probate
must settle for a dual ownership option such as a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship, a tenancy in common, a tenancy by the en-
58 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1109.
59 But see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
60 Draft, supra note 46, at 274-75 (describing increased economic wealth and sug-
gesting that property owners demand better system to handle transfer of accumulated
wealth at death).
61 For a brief discussion of mutual funds, see supra note 8. For a detailed explana-
tion of investment companies and how they operate, see Weisenberger, supra note 8, at
10-18.
62 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 1984, at 54, 57 (Kalich ed. 1984) [here-
inafter FACT BOOK]; see also Weisenberger, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that investors are
both individuals and institutions).
63 Weisenberger, supra note 8, at 12. Total funds invested in investment companies
grew from approximately $1 billion in 1940 to over $19 billion in 1960 and $363 billion
in 1984. Id. In 1948 there were only 100 registered investment companies in the United
States; today there are over 1,100 mutual funds nationwide. Id. at 11.
64 FACT BOOK, supra note 62, at 74. Holdings on registered stock exchanges grew
from a total of $18,725 million in 1950 to $37,960 million in 1960, $102,494 million in
1970, and $775,337 m illion in 1983. Id.
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tirety, or a life tenancy with remaindermen. 65 Although these forms
adequately serve situations where neither tenant objects to relin-
quishing full power over the property, they are ill-suited where one
party contributes all the money to purchase the shares and wants to
retain full control of the property during his lifetime. For instance,
in ajoint tenancy with right of survivorship, each party owns an un-
divided one-half interest and takes full title on the other's death.
66
Accordingly, by choosing the joint tenancy as a probate avoidance
mechanism, the property owner gives up the autonomy associated
with full ownership and forfeits his ability to dispose freely of the
asset.67 The same holds true for a tenancy by the entirety, which is
essentially a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between hus-
band and wife, with the condition that neither tenant can unilater-
ally terminate the right of survivorship.68
By contrast, in a tenancy in common each party owns a divisible
interest--one can give away his portion regardless of the original
purchaser's intentions. 69 Consequently, the tenant in common
loses his autonomy not because he needs other tenants' permission
to dispose of the property, but because he has given away a discrete
portion of his original interest. Life tenancy is an equally poor form
ofjoint ownership because property owners must use a will, trust, or
legal life estate to ascertain the authority of the life tenant,70 and
complex legal instruments are precisely what property owners using
will substitutes seek to avoid.
Permitting individuals to hold stocks and mutual fund shares as
pure will substitutes would avoid the problems associated with hold-
65 M. TOROSIAN, SECURITIES TRANSFER: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 60-63 (3d ed.
1979). For further explanation of these forms of property ownership, see infra notes 66-
70 and accompanying text.
66 M. TOROSIAN, supra note 65, at 60.
67 Courts have sometimes allowed one who uses a joint tenancy as a will substitute
to regain full control of the asset by ruling that, under gift theory, the donor lacked the
requisite intent to relinquish control during his lifetime. See, e.g., Blanchette v. Blan-
chette, 362 Mass. 518, 287 N.E.2d 459 (1972). Blanchette exemplifies the doctrinal ma-
nipulation surrounding will substitutes. In Blanchette, a man purchased stock through a
plan offered by his employer. He wanted to give his wife a legal right to the stock if he
died but to deny her rights during his lifetime. He also wanted the stock to avoid pro-
bate. Therefore, he chose to have the shares issued to him and his wife as "Joint Ten-
ants with rights of Survivorship and not as Tenants in Common." Id. at 520, 287 N.E.2d
at 461. Eventually the couple divorced and the wife claimed a right to the stock. To
defeat her claim, the court relied on gift theory in holding that there was no present gift
of the stock to support the donative intent requirement of the joint tenancy form. Id. at
522, 287 N.E.2d at 462. The court expressly avoided deciding for the husband on a
more traditional ground, namely, finding that he donated a future interest subject to a
life estate and a power to revoke. Id. at 522, 287 N.E.2d at 462.
68 M. TOROSIAN, supra note 65, at 62.
69 Id. at 61-62.
70 Id. at 63.
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ing such assets in imperfect will substitutes. Significantly, stocks
and mutual fund shares resemble pure will substitutes in that both
are asset-specific, that is, they symbolize an ownership interest in a
single, identifiable piece of property. 71 Furthermore, both are mar-
keted by financial intermediaries using standard form instruments.
72
Share certificates representing stock or mutual funds appear to pos-
sess the same alternate formalities that validate pension plans, mul-
tiple-party bank accounts, and other pure will substitutes. At
present, however, no form of registration enables shareholders to
transfer share certificates while retaining the ambulatory features
that pure will substitutes provide. Without clear legal authority, fi-
nancial intermediaries are unwilling to risk having their clients' in-
struments adjudged testamentary and therefore void for failing to
comply with the Wills Act.73
Express statutory recognition of the validity of POD share cer-
tificates would enable individuals to hold these instruments as pure
will substitutes. Although the UPC authorizes a variety of POD ar-
rangements, it does not expressly validate POD share certificates.
The remainder of this Note explains how POD ownership may be
expanded to effectuate nonprobate transfer of stocks and mutual
funds while maintaining the reliability provided by testamentary
safeguards.
II
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The same disenchantment that caused property owners to turn
from wills toward will substitutes prompted the UPC probate reform
movement.74 In addition to providing will substitutes where pro-
71 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1115.
72 Id. at 1109.
73 A book published to teach the Chase Manhattan Bank's clients about proper
stock registration listed the accepted forms of stock registration and warned that stock
certificates should not contain POD designations:
Stock should not be registered in the form "X PAYABLE ON
DEATH TO Y". Stock is property and cannot be made payable on death
to anyone, except by testamentary disposition. If the stock is held by X as
Life Tenant, a reference to the deed or Will creating the life tenancy
should be included in the inscription. In the absence of a deed or Will
the attempted gift to Y might be void in its inception, or it might be testa-
mentary in character, and, lacking the formality of a Will, void on the
death of X.
B. ROGERS, FORMS OF REGISTRATION FOR CORPORATE STOCK 23 (1957).
74 A precorsor to the UPC was the Model Probate Code of 1946. L. SIMES,
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW v (L. Simes & P. Basye ed. 1946) (preface). The Model Pro-
bate Code prompted many states to recast their probate laws and to incorporate its
provisions to varying degrees. Uniform Probate Code Approved by Council, 4 REAL. PROP.
PROB. & TR.J. 206, 207 (1969). In 1962, the Council of the American Bar Association
Section of Real Property Probate and Trust Law appointed a special committee to con-
406 [Vol. 72:397
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bate is dearly unnecessary, the UPC's drafters attempted to restore
testamentary disposition to its central role in property transfer by
decreasing the costs and delays associated with probate. Conse-
quently, the UPC endorses a streamlined approach to probate ad-
ministration, 75 central to which is "testator-successor control of
estate settlements. ' 76 The drafters believed that allowing the testa-
tor's chosen successors to control the estate would convince more
people to opt for probate administration.
77
Article 6, entitled "Non-probate Transfers," typifies the UPC's
innovative approach to estate planning.78 Article 6 authorizes use
of will substitutes to transfer asset-specific property to family mem-
bers by deeming various transfer arrangements nontestamentary.
The nontestamentary designation is crucial: as one of the drafters'
comments to article 6 explains, "The purpose of classifying the
transactions contemplated by Article VI as nontestamentary is to
bolster the explicit statement that their validity as effective modes of
transfers at death is not to be determined by the requirements for
wills." 7
9
Part 1 of article 6, "Multiple Party Accounts," deals explicitly
with accounts in financial institutions, including joint, POD, and
trust accounts.80 It explains in detail the rights of the persons and
institutions who are parties to these accounts, treating separately
the relationship between the depositor and the beneficiary and that
between the depositor and the financial institution.8i Section 6-106
specifically deems all transfers effected through rights of survivor-
sider updating the Model Code to promote greater national uniformity. Wellman, supra
note 43, at 201. The project culminated in the 1969 promulgation of the UPC. Draft,
supra note 46, at 273.
75 Wellman, The Unform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70, 2 CONN. L. REV.
453, 454 (1970).
76 Wellman, Recent Developments in the Struggle for Probate Reform, 79 MICH. L. REV.
501, 508 (1981); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-203 (1983) (limiting those who may
serve as estate's personal representative to named executor, surviving spouse who is
estate beneficiary, or someone selected by all successors).
77 Wellman, supra note 76, at 508-10 (citing primary reasons why private, family
administration will benefit and be attractive to most parties).
78 UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 6 (1983). The Model Code of 1947 included no such
provisions for nonprobate transfers at death.
79 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-106 comment (1983). As Professor Wellman stated:
"Transfers serving as will substitutes should not be condemned nor discouraged.
Rather, the office of the law should be to define transactions with a view to implement-
ing, rather than discouraging what people want." DRAFr CODE, supra note 57, at 7 (state-
ment of Richard Wellman).
80 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101(1), (5) (1983).
81 Id. § 6-102 to -1 13; see also Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust and P.O.D. Bank Accounts:
Virginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 49-57 (1973-74)
(explaining operation of part 1 of UPC article 6).
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ship8 2 nontestamentary. 83
Part 2 of article 6 consists of a single, more ambiguous provi-
sion codifying the remaining mass will substitutes not covered by
part 1. Section 6-201, "Provisions for Payment or Transfer at
Death," focuses on contractual agreements designed to shift or can-
cel property rights by reason of the owner's death.8 4 This section
provides:
(a) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy,
contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, de-
posit agreement, pension plan, trust agreement, conveyance or
any other written instrument effective as a contract, gift, convey-
ance, or trust is deemed to be nontestamentary, and this Code
does not invalidate the instrument or any provision:
(1) that money or other benefits theretofore due to,
controlled or owned by a decedent shall be paid after his
death to a person designated by the decedent in either the
instrument or a separate writing, including a will, executed at
the same time as the instrument or subsequently;
(2) that any money due or to become due under the in-
strument shall cease to be payable in event of the death of the
promisee or the promisor before payment or demand; or
(3) that any property which is the subject of the instru-
ment shall pass to a person designated by the decedent in
either the instrument or a separate writing, including a will,
executed at the same time as the instrument or subsequently.
(b) Nothing in this section limits the rights of creditors
under other laws of this state.85
Section 6-201 treats the enumerated arrangements as nontestamen-
tary, thereby eliminating the need to satisfy the UPC version of Wills
Act requirements.8 6 Significantly, the drafters recognized that most
82 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-104 (1983) (defining rights of surviving parties to joint,
POD, and trust accounts).
83 Id. § 6-106 (incorporating notions of § 6-104 in applying nontestamentary label).
84 Id. § 6-201 (1983); see Wellman, supra note 75, at 483.
85 Id. § 6-201 (1983).
86 See id. § 2-502 (listing UPC formalities for execution of witnessed will). The com-
ment accompanying § 6-201 explains the reason for deeming the arrangements
nontestamentary:
[T]here appear to be no policy reasons for continuing to treat these var-
ied arrangements as testamentary. The revocable living trust and the
multiple-party bank accounts, as well as the experience with United States
government bonds payable on death to named beneficiaries, have
demonstrated that the evils envisioned if the statue of wills is not rigidly
enforced simply do not materialize. The fact that these provisions often
are part of a business transaction and in any event are evidenced by a
writing to eliminate the danger of "fraud."
Id. § 6-201 comment.
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of the arrangements the section covers occur within the family.8 7
Thus, this provision bolsters the UPC's effort to allow testators and
their successors to control the disposition of their assets.
The concepts underlying section 6-201 date back to the 1950s.
The New York legislature passed a statute in 1952 that designated
the payment of certain "institutional debts" by the debtor to the
deceased creditor's surviving spouse nontestamentary. 88 Similarly,
in 1959 the Illinois legislature enacted a law designed to insulate
insurance and pension benefits from attack under the statute of
wills. 89
The efforts of the UPC drafters went farther, however, and vali-
dated a greater variety of will substitutes. As stated during the 1968
Proceedings in Committee of the Whole Uniform Probate Code,
section 6-201 addresses two problems: first, whether certain instru-
ments are testamentary and therefore ineffective because they may
not comply with the requirements for valid wills; and second,
whether two or more parties can contract to transmit property with-
out probating the estate.9 0 Section 6-201 attempted to rectify the
confusion that had developed over whether will substitutes are tes-
tamentary or inter vivos in character. The statute validated instru-
ments such as promissory notes and land contracts containing
provisions ceasing or continuing payments to named beneficiaries
upon the original payee's death.9 ' Prior to the UPC, courts deemed
such instruments void when not executed in accordance with Wills
Act requirements 92 by interpreting the death provisions as testa-
87 Id. § 6-201 comment (provisions in promissory notes and land contracts either
cancelling or transferring payments on death of payor usually occur in "family
arrangements").
88 1952 N.Y. ch. 824 (incorporated by N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1310 (Consol.
1967)); see National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Probate Code, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole Uniform Probate Code 348, 349
(July 1968) (explaining that intent of statute was to cover such things as war savings
bonds, unpaid wages of deceased, industrial insurance policies, proceeds of savings
bank trusts, and joint savings accounts).
89 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, § 401 (1978) ("concerning rights of a person entitled
to succeed upon the death of another person to an interest in certain third-party benefi-
ciary contracts and assignments") (formerly ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 601 (Smith-Hurd
1969); see Comment, NonProbate Transfers-Provisions Relating to Effect of Death: Will UPC
§ 6-201 Be "Effective" in Nebraska?, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1173, 1179-80 (1979).
90 Proceedings, supra note 44, at 341 (July 31, 1968) (statement of Charles
Horowitz). Although the legislative history is unclear, the reference to contracting to
transmit property without probating the estate appears to refer to contracting in a man-
ner which replicates testamentary disposition but does not carry with it the potential for
being declared testamentary (and therefore invalid for failure to comply with the Wills
Act). The commissioners' response was to deem the transaction nontestamentary. This
Note suggests an alternative characterization. See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying
text.
91 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201 comment (1983).
92 Id. Earlier courts consistently found that provisions such as these constitute at-
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mentary rather than finding a present interest and validating them
as inter vivos.
93
Wherever courts draw the line between testamentary and non-
testamentary transfers, they invariably characterize functionally sim-
ilar instruments in dramatically different ways, thereby yielding
inconsistent and often perplexing results.94 For example, while
some courts rejected contractual designations in other instruments,
POD designations had for years been upheld in life insurance con-
tracts. 95 Their comment to section 6-201 demonstrates the UPC
drafters' desire to purge will substitutes of the seemingly arbitrary
distinctions which previously hindered their use.
tempted testamentary dispositions and are therefore void for violating the Wills Acts.
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24 N.E.2d 102 (1939) (limited to its facts in
Estate of Hillowitz, 22 N.Y.2d 107, 238 N.E.2d 723 (1968)) (provision in bond and
mortgage to continue payments to brother and other heirs on payee's death held testa-
mentary); Juneau v. Dethgens, 200 Wis. 360, 228 N.W. 496 (1930) (provision in land
contract to be paid in installments that balance was due at death of payor/grantor and
title was to pass to grantee in fee held testamentary).
Modem courts have upheld similar provisions on the basis of third party beneficiary
concepts borrowed from contract law. Apparently, § 6-201 codified the existing major-
ity view and cleared up the confusing remnants of the older doctrines. See, e.g., Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Scarborough, 189 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1951)
(agreement by creditor that balance owing at creditor's death deemed paid upheld as
binding contract); Miller v. Allen, 339 Ill. App. 471, 90 N.E.2d 251 (1950) (provision in
mortgage note that it be considered fully paid on death of mortgagee upheld as valid
contract creating present, existing, enforceable, and binding right); McGrath v. Mc-
Grath, 107 N.H. 242, 220 A.2d 760 (1960) ("The weight of authority supports the valid-
ity of an agreement contemporaneous with a debt or a legal obligation that such
obligation shall be extinguished or terminated by the death of the creditor or the
obligee.").
93 E.g., In re Montgomery, 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 277 N.E.2d 739 (1972) (deeming valid
savings account trusts established by decedent for benefit of and payable on death to her
children despite decedent's extensive control over funds on grounds that declaration of
trust created valid equitable interest), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Montgomery v.
Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973); see Langbein, supra note 43, at 1126
("The main stratagem has been to identify some so-called 'present interest' in the trans-
feree, acquired during the lifetime of the transferor, which makes the transferee a donee
and distinguishes the will substitute from a will."); see also T. ATKINSON, supra note 3,
§ 44 (validity of contractual instruments as nontestamentary documents depends on
whether they create present interest in someone other than maker).
94 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1134.
95 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201 comment (1983). Using the third party donee-ben-
eficiary theory, courts characterize life insurance policies as inter vivos transactions ef-
fective before the policy owner's death. The third party beneficiary concept gives
beneficial disposition effect at designation, but enjoyment of the policy amount is post-
poned until the policy holder's death. Furthermore, the policy holder always has a right
of revocation. See, e.g., Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 182 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1944)
(third party beneficiary entitled to enforce policy as contract); Mutual Beneficiary Life
Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942) (right of beneficiary to enforce life insur-
ance policy is based upon contractual obligation and not property interest).
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III
ANALYSIS
A. Present Coverage of Section 6-201: Implications for Stocks
and Mutual Funds
Section 6-201 does not currently validate POD stocks and mu-
tual fund shares. Although stocks and mutual fund shares are im-
portant elements of many people's estates, the drafters failed to
enumerate them among the instruments96 which section 6-201
clearly validates. 97 Furthermore, it is unlikely that courts would in-
terpret the section's residual clause validating "any other written in-
strument effective as a contract, gift conveyance or trust"98 to
include stocks and mutual fund shares.
Apparently, no courts have been called upon to discern the
scope of section 6-20 I's residual clause. One commentator has sug-
gested that the residual clause extends the section's validation to
"whatever future products of financial intermediation that may
emerge." 99 However, it is unlikely that the "future products" inter-
pretation could cover stocks and mutual fund shares because they
are not really "future" products at all. Share certificates merely
symbolize a property interest. And although one commentator has
suggested that share certificates could be viewed as contracts evi-
dencing the investment, 00 they are not contracts in the traditional
96 Although this Note confines its discussion to the utility of contract theory as a
means of validating will substitutes, one could obviously ensure that an arrangement
falls within § 6-201 by constructing the instrument such that it fits into one of § 6-201's
enumerated categories. For example, one could cast the POD share as a trust or gift.
Such an approach, however, defeats the purpose of preserving the revocable and ambu-
latory features of the mass will substitute: the original owner clearly uses the POD ar-
rangement to avoid a detailed process such as putting the shares in a revocable trust.
97 Missouri has adopted a version of § 6-201 that specifically includes stock certifi-
cates. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.231 (1986). The statute's opening sections are identical to
§ 6-201, except that the Missouri statute adds the phrases "stock certificate" and "decla-
ration of trust." Specifying stocks evidences the Missouri legislature's judgment that
§ 6-20 I's coverage of POD share certificates is ambiguous and that a court might invali-
date such a designation. One Missouri commentator has suggested that the residual
clause in the Missouri statute validates POD designations in stock dividend reinvestment
accounts, equity accounts in cooperatives and mutual insurance associations, brokerage
accounts for stocks and commodities, custodial accounts, escrow accounts, and many
more property interests founded on debt or contract relationships. Eickhoff, Transfer on
Death Directions, 40 J. Mo. BAR 93 (1984).
98 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201(a)(1983).
99 Langbein, supra note 43, at 1133.
100 See Comment, supra note 89, at 1197. Arguably, contract analysis is the one area
in which the rationales applicable to mutual funds and stocks diverge. Because the mu-
tual fund purchaser buys the expertise and supervision of an investment company, mu-
tual fund shares are essentially service contracts. See supra note 8. Accordingly, it is
possible to validate POD mutual fund shares on a purely contractual level. Neverthe-
less, mutual fund shares ultimately represent a property interest in the fund's stock port-
folio. Validation of mutual fund PODs under the present version of § 6-201 is an
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sense. Moreover, share certificates have been in existence for years;
clearly they were not "future products" at the time the UPC was
drafted. Share certificates were widely used, and therefore not easily
overlooked, when the drafters validated specific instruments in sec-
tion 6-201, which suggests that their omission was deliberate. Thus,
the "future" concept of the residual phrase fails as a means of ex-
tending the coverage of section 6-201 to stocks and mutual fund
shares. The residual clause is more logically viewed as a protective
device aimed at those incipient instruments the enumerated portion
fails to cite.
One commentator suggests that section 6-201 adds nothing
new to nontestamentary contractual arrangements; it merely codi-
fies forms effective at the time of its passage. 0 1 Courts never ac-
cepted POD designations as effective modes of contracting for
certificate transfer. Consequently, relying upon such a vaguely
worded statute to validate POD designations would be odd indeed.
"Section [6-201] governs 'effective contracts' and it would be a
grave error to suppose that the statute possesses some special
power by which all imaginable transfers of property at death may be
validated without any consideration for existing contract law."' 10 2
B. Future Implications of Section 6-201: The Rationale Behind
the Proposed Amendment
Amending section 6-201 to include POD share certificates
would alleviate probate burdens and satisfy the policies underlying
the UPC and Wills Act formalities. Presumably, share certificates
currently pass through probate only because no alternate form of
ownership retains the ambulatory feature characteristic of testamen-
tary disposition. Yet forcing successors through the costly probate
process may be unnecessary and wasteful if there are effective sub-
stitutes for testamentary safeguards. POD share certificates closely
resemble instruments already within section 6-201's reach; an
amendment explicitly including them would be consistent with the
UPC's validation of similar will substitutes. Like revocable trusts,
life insurance, United States government bonds, and multiple-party
bank accounts, 0 3 POD share certificates are asset-specific and re-
inadequate solution to the problems posed. For a discussion of contract analysis's fail-
ings in the present context, see infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
101 Comment, supra note 89, at 1186 ("As has been the case in the past.... courts
will closely scrutinize an arrangement which purports to transfer property at death; and
once a valid and enforceable contract is found, the provisions of the parties will be given
effect.").
102 Id. at 1198.




quire similar alternate formalities in their execution. Moreover, the
POD share form preserves revocability for testators and entitles suc-
cessors to immediate control of nonprobate estate assets.
10 4
As previously noted, the alternative formality theory holds that
other devices may supply the protections formerly provided by Wills
Act formalities. 10 5 For example, financial institutions utilize rou-
tines which approximate Wills Act formalities. POD share certifi-
cates could be executed with the same formalities as the will
substitutes presently validated by section 6-201.1o6 First, executing
the POD form preserves the ritual function of executing a will. Sec-
ond, the permanent form of the share certificate, complete with its
seal, serves the evidentiary function. Third, the expedition of non-
probate transfers resulting from adherence to a standard form ful-
fills the channeling function. Last, a number of factors serve the
protective function. As with wills, persons execute PODs in their
prime, when they are generally capable of appreciating the nature of
their acts. 10 7 Furthermore, requiring that a representative of the fi-
nancial institution sign each POD share would parallel testamentary
attestation, affording at least as much protection as life insurance
agents provide. 10 8
Authorizing POD share certificate use would easily fulfill the
same goals as section 6-201's validation of other will substitutes.
Like revocable living trusts, multiple party bank accounts, United
States government bonds, and other pure will substitutes,' 0 9 UPC-
authorized POD share certificates would be revocable, reserve full
beneficial enjoyment until the original payor's death, x" 0 and entitle
successors to immediate control of the assets. In effect, amending
section 6-201 to include POD share certificates would further the
UPC's goal of facilitating transfer of asset-specific property at death.
104 For a discussion of the trend toward testator-successor control of estates, see
supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
106 See Langbein, supra note 43, at 1131 ("Motivated by considerations of efficiency
and accuracy, the financial intermediaries who operate the nonprobate system have de-
veloped simplified formalities that largely serve the purposes of the Wills Act.").
For a discussion of how institutional routines can be used to approximate Wills Act
formalities, see infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
107 See supra text accompanying note 36.
108 See Langbein, supra note 43, at 1131.
109 For a discussion of pure will substitutes, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying
text.
I10 Although in some instances beneficiaries of pure will substitutes do receive cer-
tain benefits during the payor's lifetime, full beneficial enjoyment does not completely
vest until the payor dies. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
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IV
A PROPOSAL FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE STATUTE
A. Formal Changes in the Statutory Language
The first step in amending section 6-201 is to add "stock certifi-
cates" and "mutual fund shares" to the enumerated arrange-
ments. I1  Such a change, though simple, will eliminate any question
as to section 6-201's coverage; it will clearly signal corporations,
brokerage houses, transfer agents, and courts in UPC states that
POD designations are valid means of transferring stock upon the
owner's death.
In addition, section 6-201 should be amended to provide for
the proper POD form. Adding POD share certificates to the 6-201
arrangements without specifying the incidents of the transactional
form would render the statute's application even more problematic:
individual transfer agents, courts, and financial institutions would
apply their own notions of the formalities necessary to execute
PODs and of the appropriate measures to be taken upon a change of
circumstances, thereby resulting in a lack of uniformity. 112 Unlike
part 1 of article 6, which explains in detail the accounts covered and
the involved parties' rights and relationships, part 2 (as currently
written) lacks a description of POD and TOD forms. Section 6-201
provides only that a few arrangements-those continuing payments
to a named person in event of the payee's death, those ceasing pay-
ments in event of either the payee's or payor's death, and those pro-
viding for automatic land transfers at the payee's death-will not be
held testamentary. Specifying proper form is essential to the pro-
posed amendment's success because the amended section will reach
a much wider array of transactions.
Complete statutory explication of the proper transactional form
will prove impractical because of the variety of institutional and in-
dividual arrangements (including land contracts, promissory notes,
and share certificates) in which PODs will appear. Nevertheless, the
statute should specify the basic features of a valid POD. Like the
Wills Act, the statute should include writing and signature require-
ments. Most significantly, however, the transactions' institutional
nature will render traditional attestation unnecessary. Because most
111 This Note proposes that § 6-201 (a) provide in part: "Any of the following provi-
sions in an insurance policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note,
deposit agreement, pension plan, trust agreement, conveyance, stock certificate, mutual
fund share, or any other written instrument effective as a contract, gift, conveyance, or
trust .... " See infra note 119 and accompanying text for suggested changes to the
remaining portion of § 6-201 (a).
112 For a discussion of the role of change of circumstances in this proposal, see infra
notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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of the arrangements are contractual or debt-oriented, each involves
at least two parties; a properly executed POD thus should require
the signature of a representative of each. The two-party relation-
ship will provide the protection that witnesses usually give. With
the two parties serving as mutual attestors, a sort of modified alter-
native formalities regime will be established.
113
Finally, the amended statute should include detailed provisions
such as those in article 6, part 1, defining the parties and outlining
their rights. As discussed earlier,"14 section 6-201 merely defines
the types of accounts (POD and TOD) and the parties to those ac-
counts (payee and beneficiary).115 Part 1, however, also defines the
parties' ownership rights during their lives and upon their deaths"
16
and describes the conditions under which the financial institution is
authorized to make payments from those accounts. 117 Amending
section 6-201 to include analogous provisions will notify owners and
beneficiaries of their exact rights to beneficial enjoyment of the
transaction's proceeds and instruct courts and financial institutions
as to the proper remittance of payments. 118
B. Substantive Changes
More importantly, the amended section 6-201 should accept
113 The statute should therefore be amended to provide: "Any arrangement con-
taining a provision authorizing payment or transfer at death must be in writing and must
be signed simultaneously by both the property owner and a representative of the issuing
institution in order for that arrangement to be valid." Obviously, this aspect of the
amendment would necessitate some personal contact between the issuing institution
and the shareowner.
114 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
115 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201 (1983).
116 See, e.g., id. § 6-102 (ownership as between parties and others; protection of fi-
nancial institutions); id. § 6-103 (ownership during lifetime); id. § 6-104 (right of survi-
vorship); id. § 6-105 (effect of written notice to financial institution).
117 See, e.g., id. § 6-108 (financial institution protection; payment on signature of one
party); id. § 6-109 (financial institution protection; payment after death or disability;
joint account); id. § 6-111 (financial institution protection; payment of P.O.D. account);
id. § 6-111 (financial institution protection; payment of trust account); id. § 6-112 (finan-
cial institution protection; discharge); id. § 6-113 (financial institution protection; set-
off).
118 Section 6-201 need not be as complex as article 6, part 1. Section 6-201 contem-
plates POD and TOD accounts only, and such accounts' beneficiaries cannot possess
lifetime rights to account proceeds. Amended § 6-201 would have to include (1) defini-
tions of "POD account," "TOD account," "payor, .... POD payee," and "TOD payees";
(2) a provision deeming POD and TOD accounts fully revocable and outlining the way
to effect that revocation; (3) a provision that POD and TOD payees have no rights to
transactional proceeds until the payor's death; (4) a provision protecting the financial
institution by prohibiting any transfer of proceeds without proper proof of the payor's
death and adequate evidence of the beneficiary's identity; and (5) a provision explaining
the disposition of account proceeds should the beneficiary fail to survive the payor
(whether or not a right of survival is implicated by the statute).
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the true testamentary nature of the arrangements it authorizes. The
statute should embrace the theory that any disposition authorized
by section 6-201 is testamentary, but valid, and that the UPC's other
provisions protecting testamentary transfers cover such disposition
(to the extent that those provisions do not contradict section 6-
201).119 Perpetuating the fiction that the transactions covered are
nontestamentary precludes courts from applying established doc-
trines of the law of wills to situations arising under will substitutes
which require interpretive analysis, such as when either the payor's
(owner's) intent is unclear, or effectuating the payor's expressed in-
tent is impractical or impossible. The amended statute rejects this
fiction; by recognizing the testamentary nature of pure will substi-
tutes it incorporates the interpretive principles of the law of wills
while rejecting the current statute's artificial testamentary/
nontestamentary dichotomy.
Established rules of the law of wills resolve the problems caused
by a change of circumstances following the execution of a will. In
the event that marriage, divorce, afterborn children, predecease of a
legatee, or the like render fulfillment of the testator's original intent
impossible or inappropriate, a variety of presumptions adjust the
distribution of the estate property. 120
In the will substitute context, however, there are no such pre-
sumptions. For example, if a needy child is unintentionally disin-
herited, a court has no recourse to provide for that child if all of the
deceased's assets were in will substitute form. Similarly, if a POD
beneficiary of a will substitute predeceases the payor (owner) and
the payor dies without redesignating a beneficiary, a court has no
119 Under this proposal, the introduction to § 6-201(a) would provide:
Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract of em-
ployment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement, pension
plan, trust agreement, conveyance, stock certificate, mutual fund share, or any
other written instrument effective as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust
is testamentary, but valid: any provision of the Code concerning testamentary disposi-
tion not contradicted by the language of this section is applicable, and this Code
does not invalidate the instrument or any provision: ....
This change entails the following addition to the official comment:
The language of subdivision (a) of this statute is intended to incorporate
provisions such as UPC section 2-201, concerning the spouse's right to
the elective share, and UPC section 2-202, including the value of prop-
erty transferred extra-probate in the augmented estate. As the statutory
language indicates, any provision contained within this section that con-
tradicts other provisions of this Code, such as revocation or survival re-
quirements, supercedes those provisions concerning arrangements
authorized pursuant to this section.
120 For examples of such statutory presumptions, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-601,
2-605, 2-802 (1983). For a discussion of change of circumstance presumptions in the
article 6, part 1 context, see McGovern, The Payable on Death Account and Other Will Substi-
tutes, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 7, 23-25 (1972).
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fixed means of naming an alternate taker. 121
The following hypothetical illustrates how the proposed
amendment solves these interpretive problems: posit a case where a
payor designates a share certificate as POD to a single beneficiary.
If the certificate is in writing and is signed by the payor and a repre-
sentative of the issuing institution, section 6-201 establishes its va-
lidity. Assume that the beneficiary subsequently falls out of the
payor's favor and that the payor designates his child as beneficiary.
Statutory provisions deeming the POD fully revocable will provide
that this action is clearly within the payor's power. If the beneficiary
predeceases the payor, who then dies without again changing the
beneficiary, the proposed amendment's third feature comes into
play. The amended statute will deem the POD share certificate a
pure will substitute with testamentary effect. Thus, the UPC's other
protections will ensure that the share certificate is disposed of in
accordance with established principles of testate succession. In this
case, the UPC's antilapse provision, section 2-605,122 will provide a
clear solution if the devisee is a blood relative who predeceases the
testator. When a deceased devisee is a grandparent or a lineal de-
scendant of the testator's grandparent, the section allows the issue
of the devisee who survive the testator to take in the deceased devi-
see's place. 123 In order to apply section 2-605 in this context, the
statutory words "payor" and "beneficiary" must replace the existing
language, "testator" and "devisee."
Section 6-201's present form would precipitate conflicting judi-
cial responses to changes of circumstances surrounding a POD
121 Indeed, at the 1968 Proceedings of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, the Commissioners discussed § 6-201's inability to respond to
these very issues. See Proceedings, supra note 44, at 349-50 (July 31, 1968) (statement of
Mr. Braucher).
122 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-605 (1983) (anti-lapse; deceased devisee; class gifts).
For UPC § 2-605 to apply, the statute must authorize a right of survival. See supra note
118 (suggesting right of survival be included in amendment to § 6-201).
123 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-605 (1983). Section 2-605 provides:
If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent
of the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will, fails to survive
the testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the testator, the issue of the
deceased devisee who survive the testator by 120 hours take in place of
the deceased devisee ....
Id. Application of the section is limited to cases where the deceased devisee is a direct
descendant of the testator or of the testator's grandparents. Thus, the section will not
provide clear solutions for all of the potential contingencies. If the devisee were a friend
or a more distant relative, the only other option would be for his share to pass through
the residuary clause in the testator's will. Thus, in the example given in the text, if the
predeceased beneficiary were a friend of the payor's, his share certificates would pass
through the residuary clause of the payor's will. See id. § 2-606 (failure of testamentary
provision).
1987] 417
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
transfer.1 24 Without statutory guidance, some courts might appro-
priately apply rules of the law of wills, while others might seek to
achieve their own sense of ajust result. The amended section 6-201
includes too many arrangements to permit courts to respond to in-
terpretive problems in an ad hoc manner and thus necessitates a set
of workable rules.1
25
Not only does the proposed statute provide courts with the
rules necessary to address the interpretive problems associated with
the use of POD share certificates, it adapts equally well to transac-
tions already validated by section 6-201.126 For instance, consider a
land contract under circumstances similar to those of the above hy-
pothetical: assume that the contract contains a provision to continue
payments to a named beneficiary in event of the original payee's
death. Both parties will sign the contract, thereby clearly placing
the instrument within the proposed statute's scope. The beneficiary
provision will be solely of testamentary effect and the original payee
can revoke and change it. Furthermore, if the new beneficiary is the
payee's child and predeceases the payee, section 2-605 will apply if
the payee neglects to elect a new beneficiary.
Aside from maintaining the status quo, the sole alternative to
this Note's proposed amendment would be to permit institutions
supplying will substitutes to formulate their own guidelines address-
ing a wide variety of contingencies for which courts and probate
codes already provide answers. Industry-based, firm-by-firm pro-
mulgation of regulations would entail tremendous transaction costs
and promote objectionable disuniformity as individual institutions
possessing a variety of notions concerning the ideal purpose and
form of a POD designation would draft POD forms. Furthermore, it
is also undesirable to encourage industry-wide adoption of POD
guidelines: even though this would create more uniformity than
firm-by-firm development, it would be inefficient. The proper fo-
rum for innovations in issues of probate and succession is the legis-
124 Expanding the statute's scope without directing courts how to apply it to
problems posed by changes of circumstances would not adequately eliminate the uncer-
tainty surrounding will substitutes. For a discussion of courts' inconsistent treatment of
similar issues in early nonprobate transfer decisions, see supra notes 94-95 and accompa-
nying text.
125 See Langbein, supra note 43, at 1134 ("By practicing deception to validate the will
substitutes... the courts have entangled themselves in a web of doctrinal inconsistency
on interpretive questions of recurring importance in the law of succession.").
126 Arguably, the proposal is designed more for institutional arrangements than in-
dividually contracted ones. However, the theory underlying the two types of agree-
ments is similar. There is no reason why the provisions cannot be adapted to apply to
individuals. For example, the same process for revoking an institutional POD would




lature. The most desirable solution is for the Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws to broaden the scope of the nonprobate trans-
fers covered by section 6-201, deem them testamentary, and allow
their interpretive problems to be settled by established legislative
and common-law doctrines.
CONCLUSION
Section 6-201 of the Uniform Probate Code does not authorize
the use of the POD designation with the broad range of asset-spe-
cific pure will substitutes that it should. In particular, the section
does not authorize POD stocks and mutual funds, yet these are pre-
cisely the sorts of financial instruments that should avoid probate.
This Note's proposed statute represents a means of modernizing
rigid categorical distinctions which plague nonprobate property
transfer. Specifically, section 6-201 of the UPC should be amended
to expand the list of authorized nonprobate transfer arrangements
and should include detailed provisions defining the parties, the ac-
counts, and the rights governing their relations. The law should la-
bel section 6-201 transactions based on their true testamentary
nature, rather than perpetuate the nontestamentary fiction that the
present statute authorizes. By suggesting a framework for the trans-
actional form, this proposed amendment allows established rules of
the law of wills to address interpretive problems. The time has ar-
rived for traditional inter vivos/testamentary barriers to break down
and accommodate modern forms of wealth with equally modem
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